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2003-A YEAR OF DISCOVERY: CYBERGENICS AND
PLAIN MEANING IN BANKRUPTCY CASES
HON. MARJORIE

I.

0.

RENOELL*

INTRODUCTION

WE

are all textualists now. No doubt the major methodological development in Supreme Court jurisprudence over the last few decades
has been the ascendancy of the plain meaning approach to interpreting
statutes. The mantra of plain meaning and its accompanying method of
analysis has come to fundamentally affect the manner in which legal questions are posed and answered in the federal courts. The merits of this
textualist approach have been exhaustively debated by commentators including a sitting associate justice of the Supreme Court. But trial and appellate court judges do not engage in debates over whether they should
adopt a "dynamic" or a "textualist" mode of statutory interpretation.
Rather, they interpret laws in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Court, many of which employ a plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation. Despite its simple, misleading label, a plain meaning
approach often can be difficult to apply, and it can be anything but plain.
This difficulty is especially evident when the application involves a textualist approach to the Bankruptcy Code. Enacted in 1978, the Code is
intricate, complicated and, in certain portions, hopelessly ambiguous.
Later amendments to the Code clarified some matters and simultaneously
created new puzzles for lawyers and judges. Consequently, interpreting
the Code is often a strenuous exercise that provides a proving ground for
theories of statutory construction. It is no surprise, therefore, that several
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (1997 to
Present); Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(1993 to 1997). J.D., 1973, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 1969,
University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful for the assistance of Pankaj Venugopal,
my law clerk, in the research and writing of this Article. I would also like to thank
Professor David A. Skeel for his insightful comments.
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pivotal opinions that announced the Supreme Court's textualist turn have
concerned provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.'
In this Article, I examine two judicial responses to the ascendancy of
the plain meaning approach in statutory interpretation. First, one palpable effect of the new textualism is the seeming reluctance to declare a
provision ambiguous. Statutes that may reasonably admit of varying interpretations are routinely called plain when, perhaps, a few years ago, those
same statutes would have been found to be ambiguous. Second, this reluctance to admit textual ambiguity often goes hand in hand with an exercise,
under the guise of plain meaning, that explores statutory text in light of
various considerations, including the structure and purpose of a provision.
By examining the recent en banc decision of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel.
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chineiy,2 I will discuss how this broad, contextual ap-

proach to reading statutes is supported by recent decisions of the Supreme
Court, particularly Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union Planters

Bank, N.A.3 Finally, I will conclude with observations on the role of counsel in helping judges conduct a plain meaning analysis.
II.

ASCENDANCY OF THE PLAIN MEANING APPROACH

I should clarify what I mean when I say that the plain meaning ap-

proach is ascendant in the federal courts. This is not to say that legislative
history and other considerations such as public policy find no place in
these cases. Decisions of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
referring to such extratextual aids are legion. This is also not to say that
the actual judgments of the Court are predictable; the justices often split
as to the correct result notwithstanding a unitary approach to construction. Rather, it is a question of rhetoric-framing how legal issues are

presented for disposition. If ever there were lawyers who first began their
arguments with legislative history and then proceeded to the text, their
approach is unlikely to be effective now. 4 The prevailing trend is to begin
with the text of the statute and to interrogate its meaning in light of related provisions and the broader context of the statutory scheme as a
1. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism's Failures:A Study of OverruledBankruptcy
Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REv. 887, 900 (2000) ("[T]he Supreme Court has chosen to

make the bankruptcy statute a kind of proving ground for textualist interpretation,
regularly adopting textualist interpretations to settle the law on contested questions arising under the Bankruptcy Code.").
2. 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
3. 530 U.S. 1 (2000).
4. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 530 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (describing "legal culture in which ... it was not beyond the pale for a

recent brief to say the following: 'Unfortunately, the legislative debates are not

helpful. Thus, we turn to the other guideposts in this difficult area, statutory
language.'").
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whole. Only then do courts proceed to other sources such as legislative
5
history and policy.
This approach to form does yield substantive consequences. The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals often expend so much effort in
order to find a provision's "plain meaning," they overlook signs that a statute is convoluted. For instance, courts have long been suspicious of constructions that would render other provisions of a statute redundant. As
the Supreme Court stated, it is a "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation
that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant." 6 Likewise, a clear and material drafting error might give a court pause before
7
applying a reading that seems plain. But in Lamie v. United States Trustee,

the Supreme Court adopted a plain meaning of a statutory provision even
though it contained a nontrivial drafting error and the natural reading
8
violated the rule against surplusage.
The Court in Lamie interpreted Section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which authorizes a bankruptcy court to award professional fees involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. 9 Before 1994, that provision authorized a court to "award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person,
employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor's attorney." 10

In 1994, Congress amended the provision and deleted the italicized language referring to the "debtor's attorney."'" By deleting the clause, the
legislative drafters left behind a mess. First, the amended provision requires a missing "or." It now authorizes courts to award "to a trustee, an
examiner, a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103."12
Second, and potentially more troubling, the next subparagraph, Section
330 (a) (1) (A), which sets out what a court can award, seemingly conflicts
with the amended version of Section 330(a)(1). Section 330(a)(1) (A)
provides that a court may award "reasonable compensation for actual, nec5.

See WILLIAM

N.

ESKRIDGE & PHILIP

P.

FRIcKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEC-

770-72 (1988) (describing modem Supreme Court's interpretive methodology).
6. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988).
7. 124 S.Ct. 1023, 1027 (2004) (stating Supreme Court affirms Fourth Circuit's denial of fees because "Petitioner was not so appointed").
8. See id., 124 S.Ct. at 1034 ("If Congress enacted into law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its
intent. 'It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and
to provide for what we might think . . . is the preferred result.'") (citations
omitted).
9. Id. at 1027 ("Section 330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(1) [11 USCS § 330(a)(1)], regulates court awards of professional fees,
including fees for services rendered by attorneys in connection with bankruptcy
proceedings.")
10. Id. at 1027-28 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1994)).
11. See id. at 1028 ("[T]he 1994 enactment's principal, substantive alteration
was its deletion of the five words at the end of what was § 330(a) and is now
§ 330(a)(1): 'or to the debtor's attorney.'").
12. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1) (1994).
ISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004

3

Villanova Law
Review, Vol.LAW
49, Iss. REVIEW
5 [2004], Art. 1
VILLANOVA

890

[Vol. 49: p. 887

essary services rendered by such trustee, examiner, professional person, or
attorney and by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person."' - Several courts had held that the reference to an "attorney" in the
latter subsection arguably contradicted the deletion of that same term in
Section 330(a) (1).14 Other courts strenuously disagreed as to whether the
statute should be read to allow or disallow payment of fees to debtor's
attorneys. 1 5 These courts concluded that Section 330(a) was ambiguous
16
and then turned to legislative history to interpret the provision.
The Supreme Court disagreed with this approach, finding the language of the provision to be plain despite the foregoing textual anomalies,
and held that the Code contained no authorization for payment of
debtor's attorneys' fees.' 7 Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the majority,
observed that many provisions in the United States Code contain grammatical errors.18 Courts routinely infer trivial missing words such as a conjunction or an article. As for the orphaned reference to "attorneys" in
Section 330(a) (1) (A), the Court reasoned that the term could be "read in
a straightforward fashion to refer to those attorneys whose fees are authorized by § 330(a) (1): attorneys qualified as § 327 professional persons, that
is, in a chapter 7 context, those employed by the trustee and approved by
the court."' 9 This "straightforward" interpretation presented the Court

with a problem: the construction violated the rule against surplusage. If
"attorney" just means "professional person," then its insertion after the
term "professional person" in Section 330(a) (1) (A) is superfluous. But
the Court noted that the rule against surplusage was not an immutable
decree. 20 "Where there are two ways to read the text-either attorney is
surplusage, in which case the text is plain; or attorney is nonsurplusage
(i.e., it refers to an ambiguous component in § 330(a)(1)), in which case
13. Id. § 330(a) (1) (A) (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc., 227 F.3d 123, 130 (3d Cir. 2000)
("To... read § 330 to preclude eligibility would create a glaring inconsistency in
the Bankruptcy Code."); In re Century Cleaning Servs., Inc., 195 F.3d 1053, 1060
(9th Cir. 1999) ("In contrast to the persuasive evidence that the omission of
debtor's attorneys from the first list in § 330(a) (1) was a mistake, there is absolutely no indication that the retention of attorneys in the second list was an error."); In re Ames Dep't Stores Inc., 76 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Although
debtors' attorneys were not specifically included in the coverage of the amended
section 330, Collier asserts this omission was inadvertent.") (citations omitted).
15. See Lamie, 124 S.Ct. at 1027 ("[V]arious courts disagree over the proper
interpretation of the portion of the statute relevant to this dispute, concerning
attorney's fees.").
16. See id. at 1028 ("The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Ninth
Circuits, in contrast, concluded that the text's apparent errors rendered the section ambiguous, requiring consideration of the provision's legislative history.").
17. See id. at 1030 ("A debtor's attorney not engaged as provided by § 327 is
simply not included within the class of persons eligible for compensation.").
18. See id. (indicating that numerous federal statutes lack conjunctions).
19. Id. at 1031.

20. See id. (explaining that preference for avoiding surplusage is not
absolute).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss5/1

4

2004]

Rendell: 2003 -2003-A
A Year of Discovery:
and Plain Meaning in Bank
OF DIScovERY
YEAR Cybergenics

the text is ambiguous-applying the rule against surplusage is, absent
other indications, inappropriate."2 1 Whether or not this reasoning is
sound, no layman would call this meaning plain or obvious.
This complex reasoning towards a plain meaning served a straightforward purpose. The Court explained that "[i]n this manner we avoid the
pitfalls that plague too quick a turn to the more controversial realm of
legislative history." 2 2 Yet the Court did not simply ignore extratextual
sources such as legislative history altogether. Justice Kennedy proceeded
to examine Section 330's legislative history, the consideration of which the
Court sought so strenuously to avoid. 23 Indeed, in addition to legislative
history, the Court satisfied itself that its position comported with policy
and common bankruptcy practice, while at the same time acknowledging
that this discussion of extratextual sources was "unnecessary" as the Court
24
had already found that the meaning of the provision was plain.
But the focus in cases and commentary on these "controversial" extratextual sources of meaning, such as legislative history, obscure the many
tools employed in arriving at the plain meaning of a provision in the first
instance. Thus, while Lamie illustrates the judicial reluctance to find a provision ambiguous, I next turn to two cases, the Supreme Court's Hartford
Underwritersand the Third Circuit's Cybergenics, to examine the diversity of
methods to finding plain meaning.
III.

TEXT AND CONTEXT

Like Lamie, Hartford Underwritersalso involved a Bankruptcy Code pro-

vision. The issue presented in Hartford Underwriterswas whether the phrase
"the trustee may" meant that non-trustees may not.25 Despite its deceptively simple facade, the decision illustrates how expansive a plain meaning approach can be. Beyond just a facile reading of statutory text, the
Court considered grammatical canons of construction, and also analyzed
26
the particular Code provision's meaning in light of the Code as a whole.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1033-34 (examining legislative history).
See id. at 1033 (stating that history and policy support Court's holding

based on plain language of Section 330(a)). Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, wrote to clarify his view that
when the wrong stroke of a drafter's pen (or push of a key) may result in a significant change in the law, judges "have a duty to examine legislative history." Id. at
1035 (Stevens, J., concurring). But not every Justice appreciated this turn to extratextual sources. In a footnote to the Court's opinion,Justice Scalia noted that
he joined in all of the Court's opinion but the discussion of policy and legislative
history, which is what likely prompted Justices Souter and Breyer to take the unusual step of expressly noting that theyjoined the Court's opinion in its entirety. See
id. at 1027.
25. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000) (stating issue presented in case).
26. See id. at 6-8 (explaining supporting reasons for Court's interpretation).
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Section 506(c) of the Code provides that a "trustee may" recover certain costs of preserving property from the estate itself.27 The question for
decision in Hartford Underwriters was whether Section 506(c) permitted
non-trustees to seek remuneration from the estate. 28 The Supreme Court,
in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Scalia, held that Hartford
Underwriters could not invoke Section 506(c), given that the provision's
29
plain meaning afforded the remedy exclusively to a trustee.
The Court began with the text of the relevant Code provision, invoking the oft-cited truism that Congress "says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there. 3 0° When the law is clear, our job as
judges is limited, and resembles that of our colleagues in civil law jurisdictions: we simply refer to the applicable statute, from which our judgment
follows inexorably. Or, as the Court stated, "when 'the statute's language
is plain, the sole function of the courts'-at least where the disposition
required by the text is not absurd-'is to enforce it according to its
terms.'" 3 1 The Court then concluded that the phrase "the trustee may"
did indeed mean that only the trustee may. 32 "The question thus becomes
whether it is a proper inference that the trustee is the only party empow33
ered to invoke the provision. We have little difficulty answering yes."
This overstates the plainness of the provision to some degree. After
all, on appeal was a decision from an en banc panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that divided seven judges to five. If the Code
provision were actually all that obvious, it is doubtful that several able
judges of the Eighth Circuit, who are perfectly capable of understanding
34
plain English, would have found any difficulty construing the provision.
The statute presented a vexing interpretive challenge-one that required
judges to look beyond the mere words of the provision and examine its
context. If instead all the answers lay in the words "the trustee may," the
Supreme Court could have spared several pages of the United States Reports and ended its discussion after two paragraphs. But the plain mean27. See id. at 5 (quoting Section 506(c) of Bankruptcy Code).
28. See id. at 6 (stating issue presented in case).
29. See id. at 13-14 (holding that plain meaning of provision only extends to
trustees).
30. Id. at 6 (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
31. Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241
(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Cook, 329
F.3d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that when confronted with statutory language
that was clear and direct, there was simply no interpretation required).
32. Hartford Underwriters,530 U.S. at 6 (stating Court's interpretation of provision in question).
33. Id.
34. Moreover, if the provision were all that clear, a rational litigant is unlikely
to pursue a quixotic lawsuit, urging an interpretation that would defy ordinary
usage. Or, as Judge Easterbrook has put it, " [a] 11judges follow a simple rule: when
the statute is clear, apply it. But people rarely come to court with clear cases. Why
waste time and money?" Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994).
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ing approach means more than that. Accordingly, the Court paid careful
attention to what it called the "contextual features" of the provision.
The Court looked first to canons of statutory construction, in particular, the canon that "[w]here a statute ... names the parties granted [the]
right to invoke its provisions, ... such parties only may act."' 5 Such canons focus a court's attention on the conventions of legislative drafting.
The supposition, and it is only a supposition, is that when Congress employs a particular formulation, it always intends the same interpretation.
Here, the Court concluded that it was unlikely that Congress would authorize specific action, designate a specific party to take that action, and
36
yet mean that provision to be nonexclusive.
The Court then concluded that it made sense that Congress would
only empower trustees to invoke Section 506(c). 37 To arrive at this conclusion, the Court examined the provision in the context of bankruptcy
law as a whole. 38 The Court concluded that, "the fact that the sole party
named-the trustee-has a unique role in bankruptcy proceedings makes
it entirely plausible that Congress would provide a power to him and not
to others."39 The lesson to draw is that courts need to focus on the roles
played by various parties in bankruptcy and ask, for example, whether
trustees in a Chapter 7 proceeding should have the sole right to recover
administrative claims from the estate, or, as the Third Circuit did in
Cybergenics, whether creditors' committees are in a position to pursue
40
avoidance actions on behalf of an estate in Chapter 11 proceedings.
Such questions take us far beyond the specific language of a Code provision. Indeed, the Court went on to suggest that even if the particular text
of Section 506(c) failed to mention "trustee," an examination of the context of bankruptcy proceedings would have nevertheless led to the same
conclusion. 4 1 The Court wrote, "had no particular parties been specified-had § 506(c) read simply 'there may be recovered from property
securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses, etc.'-the trustee is the most obvious party who would have been
42
thought empowered to use the provision."
35. Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 6-7 (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND
§ 47.23, at 217 (5th ed. 1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
36. See id. at 8 ("This theory-that the expression of one thing indicates the
inclusion of others unless exclusion is made explicit-is contrary to common sense
and common usage.").
37. See id. at 7-8 (explaining how Congress would not have named specific
party if it intended for statute to be broadly available).
38. See id. at 9-11 (addressing provision in context of bankruptcy law).
39. Id. at 7.
40. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel.
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 552-53 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (stating issue presented in case).
41. See Hartford Undemiters, 530 U.S. at 7 (stating that same conclusion would
have been reached even if trustee were not explicitly mentioned).
42. Id. at 7.
ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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By no means was Hartford Undenvriters's holistic approach to the Bankruptcy Code a novel mode of analysis. In an earlier case, when called
upon to interpret a different provision of the Code, the Supreme Court
instructed the federal courts to "not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to
its object and policy." 4 - The Court has also elsewhere rejected a singular
focus on the text and punctuation of a provision, observing that "[a] long
with punctuation, text consists of words living 'a communal existence,' in
Judge Learned Hand's phrase, the meaning of each word informing the
others and all in their aggregate tak[ing] their purpose from the setting in
44
which they are used."
Thus, textualists do not eschew legislative context; they simply reject
the use of certain sources, such as comments in the CongressionalRecord, as
reliable indicators of that context. 45 For instance, Justice Thomas, one of
the Supreme Court's most ardent textualists, has observed that "[t]he
plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to
the language itself, the specific context inwhich that language is used, and
the broader context of the statute as a whole."46 The structure of a legislative
scheme is a critical aid to understanding the purpose of a statute. And
further, an interpretation divorced from that purpose, abstracted from
47
that structure, may well frustrate the will of the legislature.
After reviewing the context of Section 506(c), the Court declared that
the plain meaning of "the trustee may" was that those that were not trustees, like Hartford Underwriters, may not seek reimbursement under that
provision. In Cybergenics, the en banc Court of Appeals for the Third Cir43. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986).
44. United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 454-55 (1993).
45. See Lamie v. United States Tr., 124 S.Ct. 1023, 1031 (2004) (describing
legislative history as "controversial").
46. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (emphasis added).
Justice Scalia has also noted:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not
on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by
a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of
which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage,
and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress
which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into
which the provision must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind.
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
47. As Professor Manning, one of textualism's most forceful advocates, puts it:
"To exclude legislative history ... is not to deny the potential utility of purpose.
Few would deny the possibility of gleaning a statute's overall purpose from its structure or from the aims suggested by the text itself." John F. Manning, The Absurdity
Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2387, 2408 n.75 (2003) (citing United States v. Fausto,
484 U.S. 439, 448 (1989) as "inferring purpose from the structure of the Civil Service Reform Act").
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cuit construed the precise language that the Supreme Court had found to
exclusively enable a trustee to act in Hartford Underwriters.48 At issue was
the plain meaning of the phrase "the trustee may," used in a different
section of the Bankruptcy Code, Section 544.49 If Hartford Underwriterswas
just about reading text then, guided by the "normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning, ' 50 the Third Circuit would have been
compelled to find that the phrase "the trustee may" excluded all other
parties. 5 1 But, like the Hartford Underwriters Court, the Third Circuit
looked beyond the phrase "the trustee may" to the context of the particular Code provision. 52 The question before the en banc court was whether,
as the original three-judge panel had held, the outcome was preordained
by the Supreme Court's ruling in Hartford Underwriters, or whether the
words could, and did, mean something different when introducing a dif53
ferent Code section.
Cybergenics Corporation marketed bodybuilding and weight loss supplements. 54 By August 1996, its dire finances led it to file for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 11. 5 5 In contrast to the typical procedure at-

tendant to Chapter 7 liquidation, reorganization under Chapter 11 preserves a debtor's control of its assets (the debtor-in-possession) and does
not ordinarily require the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee. However,

the United States trustee, who is tasked with important administrative
functions in a bankruptcy proceeding, 56 appointed a creditors' committee
48. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel.
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 555-59 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing Hartford Underwriters and noting differences between Hartford Underwriters
and question presented in Cybergenics).
49. See id. at 555 (same). Section 544 reads:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid any transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not
allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 544 (1998).
50. Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).
51. See Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 555 (stating court's holding). This was indeed
the reasoning and the result of the original decision issued by a threejudge panel
of the court of appeals that was later vacated by the court sitting en banc. See id.
(same).
52. See id. at 559 (distinguishing contexts of Harford Undemrritersand case at
bar, noting case at bar is one in which "the Code's envisioned scheme breaks
down").
53. See id. (questioning whether derivative suits may be maintained under
§ 544(b) after Hatford Underwriters).
54. See id. at 553 (stating facts of case).
55. See id. (same).
56. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 581 (1994) (delineating powers of United States
trustee).
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("Committee") to represent the interests of Cybergenics's unsecured
7
creditors.5
Realizing that, while in bankruptcy, its financial situation was beyond
repair, the bankruptcy court approved the sale of all of Cybergenics's assets in a court-supervised auction. 58 When Cybergenics sought to have the
bankruptcy court close the case, the Committee objected, contending that
certain transactions relating to the sale were subject to attack as fraudulent
conveyances. 59 The Committee urged that these causes of action had
value and should be pursued. 60 Cybergenics, however, was not in favor of
pursuing such claims, having concluded that litigation expenses would far
outweigh any chance of recovery. 61 Accordingly, the debtor notified the
bankruptcy court that it would not pursue any fraudulent transfer
claims. 62 Undaunted, the Committee offered to foot the litigation bill itself, so as to have the opportunity to take the matter to court. 63 When
Cybergenics refused to budge, the Committee sought the bankruptcy
court's permission to bring a derivative action to avoid the allegedly fraudulent transfers.6 4 That court urged that the Committee should do so for
65
the benefit of the estate by virtue of Section 544(b) of the Code.
Section 544(b) states that "the trustee may" avoid fraudulent transfers. 66 If a trustee is not appointed, as is usually the case, the debtor possesses the powers of a trustee. 67 The question presented in Cybergenics was
whether a creditors' committee could be authorized to sue derivatively on
behalf of a debtor that unreasonably declined to pursue a fraudulent conveyance action. 68 The District Court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Underwriters was dispositive, and that the phrase "the
57. See Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 553 (stating facts of case).
58. See id. (noting Cybergenics sold its assets via court-supervised auction for
$2.65 million).
59. See id. (stating certain buyout-related transactions could give rise to substantial fraudulent transfer actions).
60. The creditors' committee ("Committee") was so adamant about
Cybergenics pursuing the fraudulent transfer claims that the Committee offered to
bear the costs of the litigation. See id. (noting creditors' committee's willingness to
bear costs of litigation).
61. See id. (noting Cybergenics believed probability of recovery to be disproportionately low in relation to high cost of litigating).
62. See id. (noting Cybergenics informed bankruptcy court it would not pursue claims).
63. See id. (noting Committee's offer to bear costs of litigating claims).
64. See id. (explaining Committee's attempt at pursuing derivative action resulted from Cybergenics's decision not to pursue claims, even at Committee's
expense).
65. See id. (explaining bankruptcy court allowed Committee to bring derivative suit under § 544(b)).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (1998).
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988) (delineating responsibilities of debtor-inpossession).
68. See generally Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 555 (discussing procedural history of
derivative action).
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trustee may" permits actions by trustees alone, whether in Section 544(b)
or 506(c). 69 Accordingly, only Cybergenics, as the debtor-in-possession
with the same rights as a trustee, could pursue avoidance actions under
Section 544(b). Having declined to do so-end of story. The District
Court ruled that "[t] here is no principled basis under which the Court can
apply different meanings to the words 'the trustee may' in separate sec70
tions of the Code."
The en banc court of the Third Circuit reversed the District Court
and held that, to the contrary, "the trustee may" in Section 544(b) was not
exclusive and the bankruptcy court could authorize a creditors' committee
to bring an action in the name of a debtor, if that debtor was in dereliction of its fiduciary duty to protect the estate's interests. 71 Four judges
dissented, concluding that Hartford Undewriters's view of the language was
controlling and that the Bankruptcy Code did not permit such derivative
72
standing.
Although the practice of permitting creditors and creditors' committees to sue on behalf of the estate was well-established in bankruptcy, the
question was whether it was foreclosed by the Code language of Section
544.73 The leading treatise on bankruptcy law had stated that "'[n]early
all courts considering the issue have permitted creditors' committees to
bring actions in the name of the debtor in possession if the committee is
able to establish' that a debtor is neglecting its fiduciary duty." 74 And so as
the original panel expressed it, "we must decide in this case whether the
plain language of § 544 and the holding of Hartford Underwritersinvalidates
the rather well-established practice of allowing creditors and creditors'
75
committees to bring avoidance actions derivatively."
69. See id. (noting District Court's reliance on Hartford Underwritersin finding
Section 506(c) and Section 544(b) rights did not extend to creditors' committee).
70. Id. at 555 (quoting District Court's decision).
71. See id. at 566 (noting Third Circuit's textual conclusion that Congress recognized standing for creditors' committees to bring derivative actions).
72. See id. at 580-86 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (reporting Cybergenics's dissent).
73. See id. at 580 (noting central question presented is whether creditors'
committee has standing under Section 544(b)).
74. Id. at 553 (citing 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCv 1103.05[6] [a] (15th rev. ed.
2002)).
75. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp., ex rel.
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 304 F.3d 316, 322 (3d Cir. 2002), rev'd, 330 F.3d 548
(3d Cir. 2003). The issuance of the 2002 Cybergenicsopinion was met with an outcry from bankruptcy practitioners, stemming no doubt from the established nature
of bankruptcy courts' recognition of the practice of derivative standing for creditors' committees to pursue such avoidance actions. See, e.g., Michael A. Bloom &
Joel S. Solomon, Cybergenics II:
Ignoring Both Precedent and Pragmatism, 11 J. BANKR.
L. & PRAc. 417, 417 (2002) (arguing that original panel decision denominated as
Cybergenics I"literally scrapped the prior practice of granting derivative standing to
official creditors' committees in Chapter 11 cases to pursue avoidance actions on
behalf of a debtor's estate"); RobertJ. Keach, When the Committee Is Not and Wen the
Committee Is No More, 22-10 AM. BANKRa. INST. J. 34, 34 (2003) (referring to "the
momentary panic following the first Cybergenics decision in the Third Circuit").
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The majority and the dissenters disagreed as to the effect of Hartford
Underwriters.7 6 While the dissenters took Hartford Underwritersto be persua-

sive support for their position, the majority concluded that the ultimate
holding in the case simply was not controlling. 77 The majority observed
that whereas Hartford Underwriters sought to unilaterally reclaim administrative funds for its own coffers, the creditors' committee in Cybergenics
acted on behalf of the estate and only because Cybergenics, the debtor-inpossession, acted in dereliction of its fiduciary duty. 78 Moreover, the majority emphasized that, although Hartford Underwriters concerned a "nontrustee's right unilaterally to circumvent the Code's remedial scheme, the
issue before us today concerns a bankruptcy court's equitable power to craft a

remedy when the Code's envisioned scheme breaks down." 79 But, setting
aside how the two sides applied Hartford Underwriters to the merits of the
issue, every judge agreed that Hartford Underwritersset forth the interpretive method that courts construing the Bankruptcy Code were obliged to
80

follow.

After concluding that Hartford Underwriters did not dictate a decision
as to the merits of the case, then Chief Judge Becker, writing for the majority, stated that "[wie agree that Hartford Underwritersis most useful for
the interpretive methodology it offers[.]" 8 1 The text of Section 544(b)
was identical to that of the provision in Hartford Underwriters, Section
506(c), both provisions employing the phrase "the trustee may." 8 2 The
majority, and indeed the creditors' committee itself, acknowledged that
"'the trustee may' cannot be read to mean 'the trustee and other parties
in interest may."' 83 Nevertheless, the majority concluded that the issue
was not whether another party could invoke Section 544(b), but whether
the language prevented the bankruptcy court from conferring standing on
another party, such as a creditors' committee, based on the court's equitable powers.
Concluding that the text of the provision did not bar the bankruptcy
court from conferring derivative standing, the Cybergenics majority believed
that the path of the analysis in Hartford Underwriters permitted, perhaps
dictated, an examination of Section 544(b) in the context of Chapter 11 of
76. For a discussion of this disagreement, see infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
77. Compare Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 557-59, with id. at 584 (Fuentes,J., dissenting) (discussing majority and dissenting views of effect of Hartford Underwriters,
respectively).
78. See id. at 558 (noting differences between Hartford Underwriters's and
Cybergenics's creditors' committees).
79. Id. at 559 (emphasis in original).
80. Compare id. at 559 (noting outcome turns on interpretation of Hartford
Underwriters), with id. at 580 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (same).
81. Id. at 558.
82. See id. (noting both cases involved different sections but same language,
"the trustee may").
83. Id.
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899

the Bankruptcy Code.8 4 The majority began its "holistic endeavor," by
first looking to related provisions of the Code.85 Although the Supreme
Court often looks to other provisions of a statutory scheme to aid in construction, it did not do so in Hartford Underwriters. And for good reason.
The Cybergenics majority explained that "[t] he Hartford Undenriters Court
interpreted the Code holistically in determining that 'the trustee may' in
§ 506(c) is exclusive, but in that case, there was no 'whole law' to interpret, for § 506(c) is effectively self-contained." 86 Section 506(c) stands
alone as a unique remedial provision. By contrast, the majority deemed
Section 544(b) to be interrelated to several other provisions in Chapter 11
87
that should be analyzed.
For our present purposes, we may avoid the specific details of those
other provisions. Yet, while the majority construed these other provisions
as setting forth the numerous rights of creditors' committees and
"evinc[ing] Congress's intent for creditors' committees to play a vibrant
and central role in Chapter 11 adversarial proceedings," 8 8 Judge Becker
nevertheless conceded that none of the Code sections "seem[ed] directly
to authorize such standing."8 9 As noted above, in Hartford Underwriters, the
Supreme Court examined the function of a trustee in Chapter 7 proceedings and concluded that a trustee served a "unique role."9 The Supreme
Court went so far as to suggest that even if Section 506(c) had contained
no reference to a trustee, viewing bankruptcy law as a whole, a court could
safely presume that the provision was nevertheless intended to refer to
trustees. 9 1 Undertaking a similar appraisal in context, the majority in
Cybergenics considered the roles of both a creditors' committee and the
92
bankruptcy court itself in a bankruptcy proceeding.
In examining the role of a creditors' committee, the majority first
considered Section 544(b)'s reference solely to a trustee. 93 The majority
emphasized the differences between Chapters 7 and 11.94 Specifically, the
84. See id. (explaining that analysis in Hartford Underwritersis useful guidance
for interpretive methodology).
85. See id. at 559 ("'[s] tatutory construction []is a holistic endeavor'") (quoting United States Savings Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc. Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
86. Id. at 559-60.
87. See id. at 560 (stating that Section 544(b) is merely part of Chapter 11
framework and must be read in conjunction with other provisions).
88. Id. at 562 (referring specifically to Section 1109(b)).
89. Id. at 567.
90. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 7
(1999).
91. See id. (stating that had no particular party been specified, then trustee
would have been thought of as most obvious party empowered to use provision).
92. See Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 568 (examining creditors' committees and
bankruptcy court).
93. See id. at 560 (discussing sole reference to trustee).
94. See id. (showing that trustee's role in Chapter 7 is different than its role in
Chapter 11).
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majority noted that "while a trustee serves a 'unique role' in Chapter 7,
nothing could be further from the truth in Chapter 11, where trustees
rarely exist."9 5 After all, Chapter 11 reorganizations are predicated on
preserving a debtor's rights to control its assets, and so a trustee is largely
unnecessary. "Reading § 544(b) alone would lead to the fatuous conclusion that Congress vested its cause of action exclusively in a party that usually does not exist."'96 To the contrary, Congress enacted Section 544(b),
and Chapter 11 more broadly, to aid in reorganization. Given this purpose, the majority came to the conclusion that a creditors' committee
serves an important safeguarding role when a debtor-in-possession fails to
97
protect the interests of the estate.
The majority further reasoned that bankruptcy courts have a specific
role in overseeing bankruptcy proceedings. 98 It is a role which is, to some
degree, independent of debtors, creditors, trustees and estates. As courts
of equity, bankruptcy courts are empowered to further the policies of the
Code. Of course, equity or no, bankruptcy courts must act within the confines of the statutory law. The law is the law, and equity may not contravene it. But just as Congress enacts statutes that leave gaps to be filled in
by federal common law, 99 so too did Congress enact the Code while preserving the equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts. The flexibility that
is a touchstone of equity offers "bankruptcy courts ... broad authority to
modify creditor-debtor relationships"10 0 to benefit the estate.
In Cybergenics, the company's decision not to pursue a possibly meritorious avoidance action threatened the estate. Although there was no provision expressly authorizing a creditors' committee to represent the
estate's interests, the majority concluded that it was well within the equitable role of bankruptcy courts to permit derivative standing. 10 1 One may
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 564 (concluding that natural reading of Section 503(b) (3) (B) is
to financially award creditors' committees).
98. See id. at 567 (stating that Supreme Court has long recognized that bank-

ruptcy courts are equitable tribunals applying equitable principles in bankruptcy
proceedings).
99. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (permitting courts to fashion federal common law of anti-competition protection); see also Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (explaining that Rule of Reason-with
history in common-law long predating Sherman Act-was implied by Congress
into statute's mandate).
100. United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990).
101. See Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 568 (holding that derivative standing for creditors' committees is "straightforward application of bankruptcy courts' equitable
powers"). Judge Becker wrote:
The debtor refused to bring an action that the bankruptcy court found
would benefit the estate, and thereby violated its fiduciary duty to maximize the estate's value. It is in precisely this situation that bankruptcy
courts' equitable powers are most valuable, for the courts are able to craft
flexible remedies that, while not expressly authorized by the Code, effect

the result the Code was designed to obtain.
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take issue with this ultimate conclusion, as the dissenters did, but the interpretive method, to examine a provision's contextual features and to focus
on the deeper structure of the Bankruptcy Code, is not only warranted
under the plain meaning approach employed in Hartford Underwriters, it
appears to be required by it. After examining these contextual features,
the Cybergenics majority concluded that "the most natural reading of the
Code is that Congress recognized and approved of derivative standing for
creditors' committees." 10 2 But just as numerous plain meaning decisions
of the Supreme Court have nevertheless considered extratextual sources,
such as legislative history, if only to confirm a natural reading of statutory
text, the Cybergenics court went on to examine pre-Code practice and
policy.

IV.

EXTRATEXTUAL SOURCES

Having come to a textual/contextual conclusion, the majority in
Cybergenics looked to pre-Code practice and policy considerations for further guidance. 10 3 Again, Hartford Underwriters had touched on these aspects as well. 10 4 The practice of derivative standing, the Cybergenics
majority observed, was clearly established as a practice in the law of bankruptcy. 10 5 Permitting derivative standing was so prevalent that it was reasonable to presume that Congress would have been aware of the
practice. 10 6 And following established Supreme Court guidance, absent a
clear statutory expression, we are to assume that Congress did not intend
to terminate prevailing practice that existed prior to the enactment of the
Code. The majority next concluded that the policy considerations of
10 7
bankruptcy also weighed in favor of permitting derivative standing.
Judge Becker's extensive discussion reconciled conflicting opinions regarding conferring such derivative standing, proffered by amici law professors and found in the bankruptcy scholarship. After considering the
potential drawbacks of derivative standing, including the harm unmeritorious suits could cause to an estate, the majority ultimately concluded
that "[b]ecause it helps to ensure that creditors' claims are not frustrated
Id. at 568.
102. Id. at 566.
103. See id. at 569 (examining pre-Code practice for further interpretive
guidance).
104. See id. (discussing consideration of pre-Code practices in Hartford
Undemriters).
105. See id. at 569-72 (demonstrating compelling tradition of derivative
standing).
106. See id. at 569 ("Indeed, it is precisely the sort of practice of which Congress would have been aware when drafting the Code.").
107. See id. at 572 (finding that derivative standing achieves Congress's policy
goals).
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by fraudulent transfers, derivative standing seems clearly to give 'effect to
the policy of the legislature." 108
By contrast, the dissenters did not consider the majority's arguments
concerning pre-Code practice and policy to be persuasive, concluding that
the holding of Hartford Underwriters regarding the language at issue was
controlling, and expressly disapproved such considerations. 1 0 9 There is of
course merit to the dissenters' position, and their reading of Hartford Underwriters. For, in Hartford Underwriters, the Supreme Court had stated that

pre-Code practice could not be used as an "extratextual supplement" and
could not overcome the plain language of a provision.11 0 Guided by these
strong words, the dissenting opinion stated "[b]ecause the language of
§ 544 is clear, a review of pre-Code practice is totally unnecessary."1 1' Yet,
after finding that Section 506(c)'s language was plain, the Hartford Underwriters Court did proceed to consider pre-Code practice. 1 12 While the
Court found no evidence of contrary bankruptcy practice, it certainly dis-

cussed the issue.] 3 Hartford had presented several cases that it contended established a widespread practice, which the Court then reviewed
and rejected. 1 4 The Court indeed concluded to the contrary that "[i]t
was the norm that recovery of costs from a secured creditor would be
sought by the trustee."' 15 Likewise, having found that the plain meaning
of the Code supported its conclusion, the majority in Cybergenics reviewed

pre-Code practice for additional support; but, unlike Hartford Underwriters,
the majority concluded that there existed robust evidence to support the
pre-Code practice of conferring derivative standing. 1" 6 That practice,
which merely confirmed the plain meaning already identified by the majority, was viewed as adding strong support for its conclusion.
The same can be said of policy considerations. The Supreme Court
in Hartford Underwriters recited the undeniable proposition that judges are
not policymakers and may not resort to policy considerations to frustrate
the clear language of a provision. Accordingly, the Cybergenics dissenters
concluded that "[i] n light of the clear import of the language of § 544 and
108. Id. at 579 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S.
288, 292 (1960)).
109. See id. at 586-87 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hartford Underriters controlled decision and considerations of pre-Code practices and public policy
are totally unnecessary).
110. See id. (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (stating that pre-Code practices cannot be

used when there is no ambiguity in text).
11l. Id. at 587 (FuentesJ., dissenting).
112. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1,
9-10 (2000) (discussing petitioner's argument based on pre-Code practice).
113. See id. at 9-11 (discussing merits of petitioner's arguments).
114. See id. at 9-10 (considering whether precedent is sufficient to establish
widespread practice).
115. Id. at 8.
116. See Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 553 (holding "that bankruptcy courts' equitable powers enable them to authorize such suits as a remedy in cases where a
debtor-in-possession unreasonably refuses to pursue an avoidance claim").
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because the result that the language commands is not absurd, there is no
need to explore the public policy implications of derivative standing.", 17
Yet having found the Code provision to be plain, the Supreme Court in
Hartford Undemriters did just that. The Court considered and rejected
Hartford's policy arguments, and it concluded to the contrary that Hartford's position "would itself lead to results that seem undesirable as a matter of policy."1 18 In like manner, the Cybergenics majority first identified a
plain meaning and then went on to explore policy considerations that the
majority determined cut in favor of its position.' 1 9 In keeping with preCode practice, the Hartford UnderwritersCourt concluded that policy could
not overcome the plain language of a provision, though the Court did not
pretermit a discussion of it. 120 Following suit, the majority in Cybergenics
referred to pre-Code practice and policy as support for what it had already
12 1
interpreted to be the clear language of the Code.
V.

CONCLUSION

These cases also hold a significant lesson for practitioners who appear
before the Third Circuit. As is evident from the Cybergenics opinion, the
plain meaning approach does not obviate the need to thoroughly brief a
court on various sources from which congressional intent can be gleaned.
To be sure, judges will continue to be suspicious of legislative history, but
the other aspects considered in Hartford Underwriters and in Cybergenics

should be fair game as reliable indicators of legislative purpose. The plain
meaning approach does not reject considerations beyond the text of a
provision. Indeed, such an approach requires that courts and, by extension, attorneys, pay close attention to what Justice Scalia in Hartford Underwriters called a provision's "contextual features." 122 There, the Court
looked not only to grammatical canons and the role that Congress envisioned for a trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding, it also examined preCode practice and policy considerations to confirm its reading. In other
cases, context may include related provisions of the Code, the common
practice of the bankruptcy courts, 12 3 and, given the equitable nature of
bankruptcy, the role of a bankruptcy court itself.
117. Id. at 587 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
118. Hartford Underwriters,530 U.S. at 12.

119. See Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 559-67 (concluding that "missing link" in statutory language is closed by court's equitable power).
120. See Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 12 (discussing statutory language).
121. See Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 569-72 (noting that "complete doctrinal uniformity in caselaw is hardly to be expected where powers of equity are
concerned").
122. Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 2.

123. Lamie v. United States Tr., 124 S. Ct. 1023, 1032 (2004) (concluding that
its "interpretation accords with common practice").
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The need for such a versatile plain meaning approach is particularly
acute in the bankruptcy arena. 124 The law of bankruptcy poses tough
challenges for judges. The Code was the culmination of nearly ten years
of congressional debates, involving the testimony of literally hundreds of
participants. 1 25 Not only did the Code build on the decades of bankruptcy jurisprudence, but also, in some areas, Congress codified new concepts to replace prior practice. The resultant legislation was, to say the
least, intricate and complex, balancing the diametrically opposed interests
of debtors and creditors.
Bankruptcy is a highly specialized practice with practitioners who are
well versed in navigating the Code and the policies behind its many provisions. Many bankruptcy lawyers do not appreciate the fact that oftentimes
judges simply are not conversant in bankruptcy parlance and may be unfamiliar with its practice. I call this the "Fifth Floor Syndrome," in which
lawyers begin arguing and urging a particular interpretation, assuming
that judges have a suitable doctrinal foundation when, in fact, they often
do not. In other words, one must start at the ground floor and work one's

way up. The costs of the Fifth Floor Syndrome are especially high for
bankruptcy and similar areas of the law involving a complex and interwoven legislative scheme. Code provisions, like those of ERISA, are rarely
isolated; they interact in numerous ways not always obvious to even the
most learned judges. I find that the practitioner's shock over appellate
court opinions in the bankruptcy area-which happens regularly-can
often be traced to a lack of appreciation of the nuances apparent to practi26
tioners, but not to judges. 1
Superficial or limited briefing by the parties, in which insufficient attention is paid to a statute's context or relevant policy, will predictably lead
to results that may be "right" at the level of semantics, grammar or syntax,
but ultimately wrong when viewed in light of the Code or bankruptcy practice as a whole. As Cybergenics makes clear, viewing the words of Congress

124. Cf Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 538 (1993). Professor Rasmussen argues that while the bankruptcy, district and appellate courts are wellplaced to practice a more dynamic form of statutory interpretation, considering
policy implications if necessary, the Supreme Court "then selects the result that
best comports with the statutory text .. without engaging in the policy debate."
Id. He concludes that "[t]extualism is thus the best pragmatic strategy for the
Court to employ when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code." Id.

125. See

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

App.B-(b) (15th rev. ed. 2004) (noting ex-

tensive history of Bankruptcy Code revisions). For a detailed account of the debates that led to the 1978 Code, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A
HIsToRY OF BANKRuPTCY LAw IN AMERICA 136-59 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001).
126. 1 can recall the uproar in the legal community when the Third Circuit
decided In re Frenville, 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1985). While the panel's opinion was
scholarly and well-reasoned, it was nevertheless perceived by practitioners as lacking an appreciation of the decision's practical implications.
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in light of their contextual features, with an aim to preserving the ultimate
127
coherence of the Code, can make a difference.
To maintain this overall coherence, courts must be informed. Attorneys need all the relevant information regarding the contextual features
of a provision. In the words of ChiefJustice Marshall, "[w] here the mind
labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from
which aid can be derived."' 28 This proposition is no less true now than it
was nearly two hundred years ago, and exceedingly pertinent as it pertains
to the minds of judges when deciding a case in the bankruptcy area.
Though we may be all textualists now, that approach demands great attention to the context of an intricate statutory scheme such as the Bankruptcy
Code, and due respect to the will of the legislature.
127. To be certain, Congress may fix our mistakes, as is evident from the numerous amendments to the Code since 1978. Nevertheless, scholars have argued
both that Congressional intervention is often delayed and oftentimes undesirable,
creating more problems than solutions. See Douglas Baird & Robert Rasmussen,
Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost, 1999 Sup. CT. REv. 393, 433 ("Congress cannot
monitor systematically judicial interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code .... Given

two interpretative methodologies that are equally easy to apply, we are better off
with one that best maintains the coherence of the Code as a whole during the
interregnum."); Bussel, supra note 1, at 900 n.46 ("[T]he many amendments to the
Code since 1978 can often be fairly described as patchwork, ill thought-through, or
special interest legislation insensitive to the overall structure of the Code and bankruptcy policy.").
128. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.). For a
debate regarding the bonafides of Chief Justice Marshall's textualism, compare
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(2001) (arguing that Marshall Court employed plain meaning approach), with
William N. Eskridge,Jr., All About Words: Early Understandingsof the judicialPower' in
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1070-82 (2001).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004

19

Villanova Law
Review, Vol. 49,
Iss. 5REVIEW
[2004], Art. 1
VILLANOVA
LAW

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss5/1

[Vol. 49: p. 887

20

